Pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Diplomatic and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. § 4831 et seq., (the “Act”), Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB) for Benghazi to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11-12, 2012, killings of four U.S. government personnel, including the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, John Christopher Stevens, in Benghazi, Libya.
This report details the findings and conclusions of HPSCI's investigation. In summary, the Committee first concludes that the CIA ensured sufficient security for CIA facilities in Benghazi and, without a requirement to do so, ably and bravely assisted the State Department on the night of the attacks.
On September 11, 2012, a squad of armed militants in Libya attacked the American diplomatic mission at Benghazi, killing U.S. ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other American diplomats. Although the vicious attack was initially reported as a protest against an anti-Islamic video, later evidence suggested that it may have been a coordinated terrorist attack—perhaps even tied to al-Qaeda. This begged the question: Did the White House brush off a terrorist attack in order to save face? Since then, the incident has developed into a full-blown partisan debate over whether the government was involved in a cover-up or not, and worse, whether the attack could have been prevented.
On July 8, 2016, the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, approved and reported the following investigative report to the House, pursuant to H. Res. 567 (113th Congress).
If you guys don’t get here, we’re all going to f----ing die., Diplomatic Security Agent in Benghazi during the attacks, I’m in Benghazi this week, lurking about with my eyes ever-peeled for RPG’s hurtling towards my motorcade! Ambassador Christopher Stevens, to the U.K. Ambassador on the morning of September 11, 2012, We’re under attack. Ambassador Christopher Stevens, on the evening of September 11, 2012
Probably failing to plan for the day after what I think was the right thing to do in intervening in Libya. The President, on what constituted the biggest mistake of his Presidency, April 10, 2016, When Qaddafi is himself removed, you should of course make a public statement before the cameras wherever you are … You must establish yourself in the historical record … The most important phrase is ‘suc-cessful strategy.’, Sidney Blumenthal to the Secretary of State, August 22, 2011, We came, we saw, he died., The Secretary of State after the death of Muammar Qadhafi, Oc-tober 20, 2011
The Executive Branch should provide for a central planning and coordination mechanism (likely within an existing entity) for interagency threat assessment and tracking for "force protection" of U.S. facilities abroad as well as planning, operations, and response to potential attacks.
Together With Additional Views January 15, 2014 - The purpose of this report is to review the September 11-12, 2012, terrorist attacks against two U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya. This review by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter "SSCI" or "the Committee") focuses primarily on the analysis by and actions of the Intelligence Community (IC) leading up to, during, and immediately following the attacks.
The First Victim of War is Truth: The administration misled the public about the events in Benghazi Officials at the State Department, including Secretary Clinton, learned almost in real time that the attack in Benghazi was a terrorist attack. With the presidential election just 56 days away, rather than tell the American people the truth and increase the risk of losing an election, the administration told one story privately and a different story publicly. They publicly blamed the deaths on a video-inspired protest they knew had never occurred.
But now that I am the secretary and I am responsible to you and the Congress, I can promise you that if you’re not getting something that you have evidence of or you think you ought to be getting, we’ll work with you. And I will appoint somebody to work directly with you starting to-morrow… To have a review of anything you don’t think you [have] got-ten that you’re supposed to get. Let’s get this done with, folks. Secretary of State John F. Kerry (April 2013–one year before the creation of the Select Committee on complying with congressional questions about the Benghazi attacks.)
From the outset, the security environment in Benghazi was precarious. Stevens’ mission to Benghazi began in the midst of a civil war—with Benghazi serving as the home to the opposition and rebel forces. Notwithstanding the civil war’s end in August 2011 with the fall of Tripoli and later Libya’s liberation on October 23, 2011, the security environment in Libya, including Benghazi, remained tenuous. At the time the Benghazi mission was extended in December 2011, the State Department’s own threat rating system considered Libya to be a grave risk to American diplomats.
Two of our officers were killed in Benghazi by an Al Queda-like [sic] group The Secretary of State to her daughter, September 11, 2012 We know that the attack in Libya had nothing to do with the film. It was a planned attack—not a protest Summary of a statement by the Secretary of State to the Egyptian Prime Minister, September 12, 2012, To underscore that these protests are rooted in an Internet video, and not a broader failure of policy Benjamin J. Rhodes, defining one of the goals of Ambassador Susan E. Rice’s appearances on the Sunday news programs following the Benghazi attacks, September 14, 2012
Glen Doherty (born 1970) was a personal security specialist serving in Libya. He was raised in Massachusetts and joined the Navy SEALS in 1995 and became a paramedic and sniper specializing in the Middle East. He responded to the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and served two tours in Iraq. After a decorated Navy career, Mr. Doherty worked as a private security contractor in a number of countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen.
A Who's Who list of people and organizations involed in this debacle!
Overview, The decision by State Department senior officials to leave the Benghazi Mission in an undefined status left it without typical security measures and a dedicated funding stream that would otherwise apply to official overseas posts. Benghazi’s security posture was further eroded by other factors such as constant equipment failures and insufficient quantities of personal protection equipment.
Tuesday, September 11, 2012 EDT / EET 3:42 pm / 9:42 pm—First attack on the Benghazi Mission compound begins. 4:21 pm / 10:21 pm—The White House Situation Room convenes a meeting. 4:32 pm / 10:32 pm—The National Military Command Center [NMCC] at the Pentagon is notified of the attacks. 5:00 pm / 11:00 pm—Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin E. Dempsey, meet with the President at the White House. 5:10 pm / 11:10 pm—The first Drone arrives in Benghazi. 5:23 pm / 11:23 pm—All State Department personnel evacuate to the Benghazi CIA Annex. Ambassador Christopher Stevens is unaccounted for.
The very first written piece produced by CIA analysts regarding the Benghazi attacks was an overnight Situation Report written very early in the morning on September 12, 2012. This piece included the line "the presence of armed assailants from the outset suggests this was an intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest."
Of the more than 50 agents who served temporary assignments of ap-proximately 30-45 days in Benghazi, 19 were interviewed.1 Of this 19, four were agents who survived the attacks on September 11, 2012, and who had not been previously interviewed by any committee of Congress. The fifth survivor had been interviewed previously by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
September 20, 2012—Letter from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [OGR] to Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary of State, requesting seven categories of documents pertaining to the Benghazi attacks: 1) Benghazi security situation; 2) threat assessment for US personnel; 3) preliminary attack site exploitation; 4) pre-attack warnings; 5) evidence supporting or contradicting Rice statement blaming video; 6) evidence supporting or contradicting Magariaf’s statement that attacks were premeditated; 7) attack information.
Was the Accountability Review Board Independent and Comprehensive? INTRODUCTION, On October 3, 2012, the Secretary of State announced the formation of a panel known as the Benghazi Accountability Review Board [ARB]. The five member ARB was charged with examining "the circumstances surrounding the deaths of personnel assigned in support of the U.S. Government Mission to Libya in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012."
The Select Committee is authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation and study and issue a final report of its findings to the House regarding — all policies, decisions, and activities that contributed to the attacks on United States facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012, as well as those that affected the ability of the United States to prepare for the attacks; all policies, decisions, and activities to respond to and repel the attacks on United States facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012, including efforts to rescue United States personnel; internal and public executive branch communications about the attacks on United States facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012